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Abstract 
 
We examine policy thresholds of information sharing for financial development in 53 African 
countries for the period 2004-2011. Public credit registries (PCR) and private credit bureaus 
(PCB) are used as proxies for reducing information asymmetry whereas financial development 
includes all financial dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank, namely: depth, efficiency, activity and size. The empirical 
evidence is based on interactive Generalised Methods of Moments with forward orthogonal 
deviations. The following findings are established. First, PCR and PCB have negative effects on 
financial depth, with the magnitude of the former higher. Second, contrary to PCR which have 
insignificant effects, PCB has a negative impact on banking system efficiency. Third, PCR and 
PCB have negative impacts on financial activity, with the magnitude of the latter higher. 
Moreover, their marginal effects are negative. Fourth, PCR and PCB have positive effects on 
financial size, with the effect of the former higher. While marginal effects are positive, 
corresponding thresholds are not within range. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
The World Bank publication of April 2015 on World Development Indicators has revealed that 
poverty has been decreasing in all continents of the world with the exception of Africa (Asongu 
& Kodila-Tedika, 2015). According to the report, many countries in the continent are off-track 
from attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target 
(Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 2015), despite over two decades of growth resurgence that 
began in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015, p. 44).  
There is a wide consensus from recent literature that the quality of growth needed to 
reduce poverty is positively driven by financial development (Asongu, 2015; Asongu & De 
Moor, 2015). Unfortunately, access to finance in African financial institutions has been marred 
by substantial issues of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009), despite the 
introduction of public credit registries (PCR) and private credit bureaus (PCB) to mitigate the 
information asymmetry associated with financial development (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). The 
underlying measures towards reducing information asymmetry have fundamentally been linked 
to the imperative of increasing information sharing among banks in order to reduce adverse 
selection and moral hazard between lenders and borrowers. This is supported by a substantial 
bulk of African finance literature documenting that basic financial access (like credit, payments, 
private and corporate insurance) has been substantially constrained by a plethora of factors that 
limit, inter alia: eligibility, physical access and affordability (Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Allen et 
al., 2011).  
There has been a considerable bulk of theoretical studies sustaining the position that 
information asymmetry (hence IA) between lenders and borrowers affects financial development 
by reducing the efficient allocation of capital (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). In essence, lenders are 
most often confronted with issues of adverse selection owing to their lack of information on the 
characteristics of borrowers, especially when it comes to risks associated with the investment for 
which borrowers want to mobilise financial resources. In addition, the concern is even more 
worrisome when lenders are unable to control the actions of borrowers after credit has been 
granted. Accordingly, a borrower could decide to conceal the proceeds of the underlying 
investment in order to reduce responsibility in event of default or prevent repayment of the 
underlying debt. Such tendencies are not exclusively reflected from insolvent borrowers since 
solvent borrowers could also fall into the temptation of manoeuvring to avoid complying with 
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reimbursing financial obligations associated with the loan. Ultimately, in order for lenders to 
caution against such risks, credits are often characterised with rationing activity and high interest 
rates, which has substantial consequences, in financial development, growth and poverty 
alleviation. These downsides can be limited by the sharing of information on borrowers’ 
solvency characteristics. PCB and PCR serve as information brokers by providing the much 
needed information to banks. Consistent with Jappelli and Pagano (2002), by sharing 
information, these brokers enable, inter alia: the efficient allocation of capital, relaxation of 
credit constraints and increase of credit market competition.  
 In light of the above, there has been a substantial body of the literature devoted to 
assessing: (i) the role of IA among creditors and (ii) the effect of stronger rights to information 
by creditors. The former (i), has examined how the sharing of information improves credit 
availability (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014), reduce credit cost 
(Brown et al., 2009), decrease rates of default (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002), affects corruption-
related lending (Barth et al., 2009), influences antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012) and affect 
syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010). The latter (ii) has assessed the role 
of stronger creditor rights in, among others: capital structure (El Ghoul et al., 2012), risk-taking 
by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011) and bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 
2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009).  
 What is quite apparent in the above literature is the overwhelming focus on regions where 
concerns about financial access are relatively less severe. In essence, whereas a great bulk of the 
literature has been devoted to developed countries and the emerging economies of Asia and 
Latin America, very little scholarly focus have been oriented towards Africa, a continent with the 
lowest level of financial development (Galindo and Miller, 2001; Love and Mylenko, 2003; 
Barth et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014).  
Galindo and Miller (2001) have provided macroeconomic evidence to establish that 
countries with more advanced development in credit registries are rewarded with less financial 
restrictions relative to those with credit bureaus that are less developed. Particularly, credit 
registries that are performing well, account for substantial decreases in a firm’s sensitivity in 
investment decisions for ‘cash flows availability’, a typical proxy in the literature for financial 
constraints. As for Latin American countries, the authors conclude that there has been a 
reduction in the performance of credit registries by about 50% of how investment decisions are 
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sensitive to internal funds.  Love and Mylenko (2003) have combined firm-level data from the 
World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) with data on public and private credit 
registries to assess  if, (i) from the perception of managers and (ii) higher sharing of financing 
from the bank, the existence of credit registries is negatively associated with credit financing 
constraints. Findings reveal that the presence of private registries is linked to higher share of 
bank financing and lower financing constraints, whereas  the presence of public registries do not 
appear to exert any significant impact on underlying financing constraints. Barth et al. (2009) 
investigate the impact of lender and borrower competition as well as the sharing of information 
through credit registries/bureaus on corruption in lending by banks using WEBS covering 4,000 
firms across 56 countries, and private credit in 129 countries. Two main findings are established. 
First, both information sharing and banking competition mitigate ‘lending corruption’ and the 
sharing of information plays a positive role in influencing competition to curtail corruption in 
lending. Second, it is also found that the legal environment, firm competition and ownership 
structure of banks and firms, have significant lending effects on lending corruption. Triki and 
Gajigo  (2014) have  examined: (i) the impact of private and public credit registries on access to 
finance by firms and (ii) the effect of PCR’s design on the seriousness of financing constraints, 
in 42 African countries. Their findings show that: (i) access to finance is averagely higher in 
countries with PCB relative to those with PCR or neither institution and (ii) there is substantial 
heterogeneity in financial access and design of information sharing institutions among countries 
with PCR.  
 The above studies leave room for improvement in three main areas: sampling, data and 
methodology. First, very few lines of inquiry have been positioned on Africa, in spite of the 
continent having the most acute financial access problems. Consistent with the engaged 
literature, Love and Mylenko (2003) and Barth et al. (2009) have positioned their inquiries on 
respectively four and nine African countries. Whereas Galindo and Miller (2001) involve no 
African country, Triki and Gajigo (2014) which is closest to the present study have based their 
analysis on 42 African countries for the period 2006-2009. We fill underlying gaps by working 
on 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011.   
Second, the discussed literature above, as well as recent information sharing (Houston et 
al., 2010) and IA (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010 ) literature have been limited to bank 
specific measurement of constraints to financial access. We steer clear of this literature by using 
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all financial dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) 
of the World Bank. These dimensions include financial dynamics of depth (overall economic 
depth and financial system depth), efficiency (at banking and financial systems levels), financial 
activity (from banking and financial system perspectives) and size. The plethora of dimensions 
has been documented to provide more holistic policy implications (Asongu, 2014). In essence, 
the fundamental objective of increasing (reducing) information sharing (information asymmetry) 
is to improve financial intermediation efficiency and the sharing of information to boost 
competition and reduce informational rents, which could lead to more lending or financial 
activity (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). Increasing financial activity and financial allocation 
efficiency logically implies, increasing financial depth and size within an economy. 
Third, a bulk of the literature has consistently failed to present findings that are robust to 
endogeneity. Ivashina (2009, p. 301) has cautioned that the proper examination of IA in the 
banking industry should account for endogeneity, in order to avoid biased estimations and 
misplaced policy implications. For instance whereas Jappelli and Pagano (2002) have used 
Ordinary Least Squares while controlling for potential unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, 
Triki and Gajigo  (2012) do not go further to tackling inherent issues of simultaneity between 
information sharing offices (ISO)
2
 and the banking industry: “Our results show that firms in 
countries with PCBs report relatively smaller obstacle in access to finance relative to those in countries 
with a PCR. However, this effect is not robust to controlling for GDP per capita and the private credit to 
GDP ratio, which suggests that the presence of a PCB is not exogenous. In other words, the level of 
financial sector development and the creation of a PCB may be simultaneously determined.” (p. 75). 
As highlighted above, it is important to recall that the positioning of this inquiry on 
Africa is due to scarce literature on the subject in the continent, in spite of: (i) recommendations 
for more scholarly focus on the underlying issues (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13) and (ii) growing 
concerns about whether African financial institutions are tailoring information from ISO to 
improve their returns instead of increasing financial allocation efficiency and activity (Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014). In essence, the nexus between information sharing and bank lending remains an 
open debate in theoretical and empirical literature (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002)
3
.   
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 For the purpose of simplicity, we used ISO to denote both PCR and PCB.  
3
 “On the whole, all three models agree on the prediction that information sharing (in one form or another) reduces 
default rates, whereas the prediction concerning its eﬀect on lending is less clear-cut” (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, p. 
2020).  As we shall see in the Data section, the corresponding lending dimension is articulated by financial 
dynamics of allocation efficiency and activity.  
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The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical analysis, discussion of results and implications are covered in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 2004-2011 from 
African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank. Consistent with the motivation of the study, baseline financial 
development indicators are transformed in accordance with Asongu (2013, 2014) to obtain 
dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size.  
 First, two indictors of financial depth entail: (i) overall-economic depth (M2/GDP) 
representing the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits and (ii) financial system 
deposits (Fdgdp) in terms of liquid liabilities. We distinguish the former from the latter because; 
a substantial portion of the monetary base in less developed countries does not transit via formal 
financial institutions. Second, by financial intermediation efficiency, we refer to the ability of 
banks to fulfil their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit. Two 
measurements are used, namely: (i) banking-system-efficiency (with bank credit on bank 
deposits: Bcbd’) and (ii) financial-system-efficiency (with ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ 
and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd’). Third, by financial 
intermediary activity, we denote the bank’s ability to grant credit to economic agents. Two 
proxies are also employed, namely: (i) banking system activity (with ‘private domestic credit by 
deposit banks: Pcrb’) and (ii) financial system activity (with ‘private credit by domestic banks 
and other financial institutions: Pcrbof”). Fourth, financial size is the ratio of ‘deposit bank 
assets’ to ‘total assets’ (‘deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets’: 
Dbacba).  
 Consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014), we measure information asymmetry with Public 
Credit Registries (PCR) and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB). In accordance with the underlying 
literature, there are six principal distinguishing features between PCR and PCB: access, data 
sources used, ownership, status, coverage and purpose. First, access to PCB (PCR) is open to all 
types of lenders (restricted to information providers). Second, data used by PCR is obtained from 
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bank and non-bank financial institutions whereas PCB includes: PCR, courts, tax authorities and 
utilities to the sources used by PCR, for information. Third, as concerns ownership, PCR belong 
to central banks or governments, while the ownership of PCB extends beyond the underlying 
institutions (governments or central banks) to lenders, independent third parties and lenders’ 
associations.  Fourth, while PCR are not profit making registries, PCB are principally established 
for profit. Fifth, whereas coverage provided by PCR is principally on large corporations and 
restricted in terms of history and type of data (or information) provided, PCB extend well 
beyond large corporations, to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), which have longer 
histories and richer data. Fifth, while PCR represent public institutions that are established with 
the main mission of supervising the banking sector, PCB are created because of demand for and 
need of information on borrowers in the banking market. Therefore, data from PCR used to 
assess clients’ credit-worthiness could also be considered as some form of by-product or 
collateral benefit of PCR.  
The control variables include: inflation, public investment, GDP growth, trade and 
foreign aid. These control indicators have been substantially documented in the financial 
development literature (Osabuohein et al, 2013; Huang, 2005; Asongu, 2014). First, some major 
national macroeconomic policies such as maintaining lower inflation and higher investment have 
been established to be favourable to financial development (Huybens & Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 
2001; Huang, 2011). Huybens and Smith (1999) and Boyd et al. (2001) have theoretically and 
empirically investigated the impacts of inflation on financial development and concluded that 
economies with higher inflation rates are likely to be rewarded with smaller, less efficient and 
less active banks. Second, the nexus between investment and financial development has been 
assessed by Huang (2011) who has concluded on a positive relationship.  Third, some studies 
support the perspective that policies which are favourable to openness in terms of external trade 
are positively associated with higher levels of financial development (Do & Levchenko, 2004; 
Huang & Temple, 2005). Fourth, a plethora of papers have established the positive nexus 
between growth and finance (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 199; Saint-Paul, 1992; Asongu, 2015). 
According to the narrative, economic prosperity in terms of economic growth is associated with 
decreasing cost of financial intermediation owing to intensive competition, involving a 
substantial scale of funds made available for productive investments. Moreover, the importance 
of income-levels in financial development has been substantially documented in the literature 
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(Levine, 1997; Asongu, 2012). For instance: (i) Jaffee and Levonian (2001) have shown that 
income levels have a positive impact on banking system structure and (ii) Asongu (2012) has 
concluded that African countries with higher income levels are associated with better financial 
development. Fifth, analogous to remittances (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Efobi et al., 2014 ), foreign 
aid that is spent in recipient countries and not captured  by consultancy services in advanced 
nations is more likely to boost financial development. It should be noted that expected signs of 
the control variables cannot be definitely established because the financial variables present 
contrasting dynamics. For example financial efficiency is in broad terms the ratio of financial 
depth on financial activity (deposits/credit).  
The definition and sources of the variables are provided in Appendix1, the summary 
statistics in Appendix 2 while the correlation analysis in Appendix 3.   From the summary 
statistics, we notice that: (i) the means are comparable and (ii) given the substantial degree of 
variation, we can be confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. The 
purpose of correlation matrix is to avoid multicollinearity and overparameterization issues that 
could substantially bias estimated coefficients.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
We adopt a two-step Generalised Methods Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal 
deviations instead of differencing as empirical strategy. This strategy is an extension by 
Roodman (2009ab) of Arellano and Bover (1995) which has the positive sides of : (i) restricting 
the proliferation of instruments and (ii) controlling for cross-sectional dependence (Love & 
Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). The endogeneity-robust empirical technique is important because 
as we have seen in the introduction: (i) the are inherent issues of endogeneity in the modelling of 
IA (Ivashina, 2009) and (ii) Triki and Gajigo (2014) have also admitted in the introduction of 
their paper that they have failed to take it into account.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
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Where: tiFD ,  
 is the financial development (depth, efficiency, activity and size) of country i
 
at  
period t ; is a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  PCR , Public Credit Registries; PCB , Private Credit 
Bureaus; Inter , interaction among either PCR ( PCRPCR ) or PCB  ( PCBPCB );
 
W  is the 
vector of five control variables  (inflation, public investment, GDP growth, trade and foreign 
aid),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In 
the specification, we prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is 
heteroscedasticity-consistent. Adoption of the GMM approach presupposes that the number of 
cross-sections should be higher than the number of time series in cross-sections (N>T) and the 
dependent variables should be persistent. These conditions are fulfilled because on the one hand 
53>8(2004-2011) and on the other hand, the overwhelming persistence of the dependent 
variables is provided in Appendix 4. Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls in 
interactive regressions: (i) all constitutive terms are included in the specifications and (ii) the 
effect of the modifying variables (or ISO) which should be within range is interpreted in terms of 
marginal impact.  
   
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results  
In this section we present estimated findings. Table 1(2) show results for financial depth 
(efficiency) whereas Table 3 reveals those for financial activity and size. We associate three 
specifications to each of the seven financial variables employed: (i) a baseline specification in 
which we assess the effects of PCR and PCB without interactions, (ii) a second specification 
with interactive PCR to assess the marginal effect of increasing PCR and (iii) a third 
specification with interactive PCB to examine the marginal impact of increasing PCB. It should 
be noted that, in spite of PCR being part of PCB, we enter them simultaneously into the first 
specification because they do not suffer from issues of multicollinearity because their 
corresponding correlation coefficient is -0.14 (see Appendix 3).   
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The specifications are tailored to avoid issues of instrument proliferation by ensuring that 
the number is instruments for each specification is lower than the corresponding number of 
cross-sections. We consider valid specifications only those for which post-estimation tests 
confirm the validity of instruments and absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. First, for the 
autocorrelation test, the second-order Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test is preferred 
to the first-order because the latter is traditionally expected to be significant. Second, in event of 
conflict of interest, the Hansen overindentifying restrictions (OIR) test is preferred to the Sargan 
alternative because it is more robust. We also complement the Hansen test with the difference-in-
Hansen test for instrument exogeneity. It should be noted that the Sargan OIR test is not robust 
and not weakened by many instruments whereas the Hansen OIR test is robust and weakened by 
many instruments. Therefore, as highlighted earlier, by ensuring that the rule of thumb on 
instrument proliferation is respected, we also use the Hansen test to assess the exogeneity of 
instruments.  
The left-hand-side (LHS) of Table 1 shows findings for overall economic depth while the 
right-hand-side (RHS) presents results corresponding to financial system depth. The following 
findings can be established. First, while PCR consistently have a negative impact on financial 
depth, PCB exerts a negative effect exclusively in the baseline regression of money supply. The 
negative magnitude of PCR is higher, relative to PCB. Second, from the interactions, whereas 
PCR interactions still exert a negative effect on financial system depth, the effect of PCB 
interactions is positive, albeit not significant. It follows that; PCB may be more instrumental in 
increasing financial depth relative to PCR. Third, but for GDP growth, the significant control 
variables have the expected signs. Accordingly, as we have justified in the Data section, public 
investment (Huang, 2011), trade (Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005) and foreign 
aid have been documented to be associated with higher levels of financial development (Asongu, 
2014).  
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Table 1: Financial Depth and Information Asymmetry   
       
 Financial Depth 
       
 Economic Depth (Money Supply) Financial System Depth (Deposits) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  -3.917* -7.294*** -2.509 -3.838** -5.441*** -3.534*** 
 (0.073) (0.001) (0.156) (0.040) (0.008) (0.009) 
Money Supply (-1) 1.115*** 1.083*** 1.003*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Fin. System Deposits (-1) --- --- --- 1.056*** 1.099*** 1.035*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.236*** -0.146** --- -0.162*** -0.143*** --- 
 (0.000) (0.022)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.114*** --- -0.052 -0.023 --- -0.050 
 (0.003)  (0.174) (0.297)  (0.105) 
PCR*PCR --- -0.001 --- --- -0.001** --- 
  (0.175)   (0.033)  
PCB*PCB --- --- 0.0008 --- --- 0.001 
   (0.180)   (0.102) 
GDP growth  -0.176*** -0.182*** -0.179*** -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.101*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.011 -0.008 0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 
 (0.359) (0.480) (0.717) (0.598) (0.204) (0.422) 
Public Investment  -0.038 0.038 -0.043 -0.004 0.080*** 0.029 
 (0.337) (0.254) (0.167) (0.891) (0.005) (0.310) 
Foreign Aid  0.020 0.079* 0.023 0.083* 0.088* 0.075* 
 (0.696) (0.097) (0.661) (0.060) (0.073) (0.059) 
Trade  0.042** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.047** 0.042* 0.037*** 
 (0.034) (0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.055) (0.000) 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.881) (0.994) (0.350) (0.703) (0.629) (0.349) 
Sargan OIR (0.004) (0.002) (0.052) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.253) (0.140) (0.318) (0.293) (0.154) (0.442) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.085) (0.162) (0.017) (0.382) (0.205) (0.112) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.565) (0.228) (0.941) (0.284) (0.215) (0.778) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.435) (0.234) (0.243) (0.256) (0.317) (0.257) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.137) (0.148) (0.536) (0.444) (0.103) (0.799) 
       
Fisher  2332.01*** 2503.26*** 6921.22*** 3191.03*** 15848.7*** 11732.7*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  258 260 260 258 260 260 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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 In Table 2 on financial efficiency and IA, specifications on the RHS for financial system 
efficiency are invalid because they fail to align with the information criterion for the absence of 
autocorrelation. First, we find that PCB is significantly and negatively linked to banking system 
efficiency whereas the effect of PCR is not significant. Second, the interactions among PCR and 
PCB respectively in specifications 2 and 3 are not significant. Third, the significant control 
variables have signs that are expected and contrasting with those of Table 1 for reasons already 
provided in the Data section. In essence, financial depth (in Table 1) is contrasting with financial 
allocation efficiency (in Table 2) because it (for the most part) measures financial development 
in terms of financial deposits (or liquid liabilities), whereas financial allocation efficiency is the 
degree by which such deposits are transformed into credit (or financial activity).   
 
Table 2: Financial Efficiency and Information Asymmetry   
       
 Financial Efficiency 
       
 Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 
 Baseline  PCR PCB Baseline  PCR PCB 
Constant  28.790*** 24.414*** 20.267*** 19.323*** 11.381*** 12.379*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) 
Banking System Efficiency (-1) 0.767*** 0.761*** 0.812*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial System Efficiency (-1) --- --- --- 0.882*** 0.818*** 0.827*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) 0.148 -0.117 --- -0.087 -0.160 --- 
 (0.184) (0.618)  (0.212) (0.146)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.191** --- -0.058 -0.443*** --- 0.008 
 (0.029)  (0.691) (0.000)  (0.928) 
PCR*PCR --- 0.004 --- --- 0.004* --- 
  (0.314)   (0.051)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.0007 --- --- -0.005*** 
   (0.767)   (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.552*** 0.560*** 0.452*** 0.580*** 0.612*** 0.569*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** -0.013 0.099 0.031 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.878) (0.163) (0.706) 
Public Investment  -0.405*** -0.301** -0.343 -0.175* -0.096 -0.140 
 (0.002) (0.037) (0.003) (0.089) (0.224) (0.137) 
Foreign Aid  -0.612*** -0.399*** -0.273** -0.478*** -0.220*** -0.211** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.031) (0.000) (0.004) (0.017) 
Trade  -0.058** -0.015 0.004 -0.030 0.041 0.042 
 (0.035) (0.661) (0.874) (0.392) (0.219) (0.295) 
       
AR(1) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.047) (0.142) (0.029) 
AR(2) (0.120) (0.123) (0.138) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) 
Sargan OIR (0.209) (0.369) (0.107) (0.013) (0.000) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.598) (0.503) (0.421) (0.515) (0.168) (0.221) 
       
DHT for instruments       
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(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.753) (0.554) (0.564) (0.381) (0.258) (0.201) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.414) (0.422) (0.326 (0.555) (0.201) (0.321) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.676) (0.525) (0.325) (0.406) (0.390) (0.473) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.340) (0.391) (0.583) (0.622) (0.080) (0.087) 
       
Fisher  519.23*** 1410.72*** 4035.65*** 152.46*** 700.86*** 337.49*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  265 267 267 258 260 260 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 We discuss the results presented in Table 3 below along two strands, namely in terms of: 
financial activity and financial size. First, as regards the findings of financial activity, the 
following can be established. (1) Both PCR and PCB have negative effects on financial activity, 
with the negative magnitude of the latter higher on the dependent variable. (2) Increasing PCR 
and PCB with interaction effects does not change the negative signs because the marginal effects 
are still negative. (3) The significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 Second, on the relationships with financial size, the following findings are apparent. (1) 
Both PCR and PCB have positive effects on the dependent variable, with the impact of the 
former higher. (2) Increasing PCR and PCB beyond certain thresholds lead to significant 
marginal effects but unfortunately, the modifying thresholds are not within range, notably: 57.57 
(0.403/0.007) for PCR and 102.5 (0.205/0.002) for PCB. Accordingly, the corresponding ranges 
provided by the summary statistics in Appendix 2 are respectively ‘0 to 49.8’ and ‘0 to 64.8’. (3) 
The significant control variables have the expected signs.  
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Table 3: Financial Activity, Financial Size and Information Asymmetry   
          
 Financial Activity    
          
 Banking System Activity (Pcrb ) Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) Financial Size 
 Baseline  PCR PCB Baseline  PCR PCB Baseline  PCR PCB 
Constant  -1.024 -2.411* -3.196*** 1.266 -0.027 -3.246*** 20.078*** 21.699*** 19.688*** 
 (0.551) (0.087) (0.001) (0.468) (0.987) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Banking Sys. Activity  (-1) 1.173*** 1.143*** 1.038*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Financial  Sys. Activity (-1) --- --- --- 1.150*** 1.125*** 1.058*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial Size (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.699*** 0.675*** 0.734*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.171*** -0.068 --- -0.120*** -0.054* --- 0.134** 0.403*** --- 
 (0.000) (0.166)  (0.000) (0.097)  (0.011) (0.000)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.096*** --- -0.003 -0.086*** --- 0.048* 0.057** --- 0.205*** 
 (0.000)  (0.921) (0.000)  (0.076) (0.032)  (0.000) 
PCR*PCR --- -0.001** --- --- -0.0008* --- --- -0.007*** --- 
  (0.020)   (0.075)   (0.000)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.0004 --- --- -0.001*** --- --- -0.002*** 
   (0.307)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.035 0.049 0.024 -0.013 0.020 0.016 0.047 -0.024 -0.018 
 (0.267) (0.147) (0.414) (0.733) (0.634) (0.615) (0.323) (0.575) (0.752) 
Inflation -0.022 -0.016 -0.013 -0.036 -0.022 -0.019*** -0.107*** -0.100** -0.101** 
 (0.344) (0.347) (0.335) (0.161) (0.293) (0.034) (0.009) (0.019) (0.031) 
Public Investment  0.179*** 0.168*** 0.053* 0.156*** 0.145*** 0.069** 0.134* 0.141**   0.225*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.080) (0.037) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid  0.010 -0.019 0.048** -0.045 -0.052 0.044** -0.018 0.082 0.001 
 (0.811) (0.596) (0.012) (0.351) (0.201) (0.048) (0.828) (0.306) (0.988) 
Trade  -0.023 -0.008 0.031*** -0.040** -0.027* 0.023* 0.063*** 0.058** 0.020 
 (0.218) (0.607) (0.008) (0.025) (0.088) (0.062) (0.007) (0.023) (0.372) 
          
AR(1) (0.043) (0.036) (0.013) (0.115) (0.085) (0.023) (0.076) (0.069) (0.060) 
AR(2) (0.389) (0.229) (0.232) (0.178) (0.097) (0.113) (0.716) (0.706) (0.515) 
Sargan OIR (0.170) (0.058) (0.000) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.603) (0.598) (0.768) 
Hansen OIR (0.261) (0.494) (0.395) (0.292) (0.367) (0.254) (0.633) (0.730) (0.782) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.327) (0.257) (0.467) (0.260) (0.394) (0.433) (0.726) (0.426) (0.354) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.277) (0.641) (0.351) (0.368) (0.363) (0.215) (0.471) (0.783) (0.883) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.535) (0.614) (0.549) (0.435) (0.320) (0.301) (0.665) (0.727) (0.872) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.090) (0.265) (0.208) (0.182) (0.473) (0.274) (0.414) (0.499) (0.344) 
          
Fisher  3115.95*** 20933.4*** 5309.26*** 3495.71*** 12445.2*** 15962.7*** 379.52*** 853.78 *** 970.06*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  258 260 260 260 262 262 260 262 262 
          
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
3.2 Further discussion and policy implications  
 We engage this section in four main strands, namely discussion on: (i) general findings in 
relation to surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions, (ii) specific findings and their 
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relation with existing literature, (iii) quality of life hypothesis (QLH) and the role of information 
sharing offices (ISO) and (iv) relations to moral hazard on the part borrowers and disciplinary 
effect from ISO.   
 First, the concern about surplus liquidity in African financial institutions has been broadly 
confirmed from the findings. Accordingly, the inability of banks to increase allocation efficiency 
and financial activity with the help of ISO may imply that the use of PCR and PCB as means to 
addressing investment needs (through the fight against surplus liquidity) have not yielded the 
expected outcomes. It is relevant to recall that the underlying issues of excess cash within formal 
banking establishments (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009) represent one of the most important 
challenges in African business literature (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 
2011; Darley, 2012).  As a policy implication, in addition to improving the current structure and 
relevance of ISO, other measures could be tailored towards fighting surplus liquidity issues, 
notably on: (i) voluntary holding of surplus liquidity (easing issues associated with interbank 
lending, facilitating banks to track their positions at central banks, inter alia) and (ii) involuntary 
holding of surplus liquidity (developing regional stock markets for more investment 
opportunities by banks, creating an enabling environment that facilitates spreads between bonds 
and reserves, among others).  
 Second, it is important to also discuss our findings in the light of the existing literature 
engaged analytically in the introduction. Accordingly, our findings could be summarised in the 
following. (1) PCR and PCB have negative effects on financial depth, with the magnitude of the 
former higher. (2) Contrary to PCR which have insignificant effects, PCB has a negative impact 
on banking system efficiency. (3) PCR and PCB have negative effects on financial activity, with 
the magnitude of the latter higher. Moreover, marginal effects for both are negative. (4) Both 
PCR and PCB have positive effects on financial size, with the effect of the former higher. While 
marginal effects are positive, corresponding thresholds are not within range.  
 The above findings substantially run counter to Singh et al. (2009) who have established 
that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that encourage the sharing of credit information are more 
likely to be rewarded with higher levels of credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. This 
measure of financial development has been termed ‘financial activity’ in this line of inquiry. The 
position by Galindo and Miller (2001) that countries with more advanced development in credit 
registries are rewarded with less financial restrictions relative to those with credit bureaus that 
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are less developed, can only be confirmed  in our findings from the perspective of financial size. 
In the same vein, the findings of Love and Mylenko (2003) are also only partially confirmed. 
According to the authors, the presence of private registries is linked to a higher share of bank 
financing and lower financing constraints, whereas the presence of public registries do not 
appear to exert any significant impact on underlying financing constraints.  
 We compare our findings with those of Triki and Gajigo (2014) in more depth because as 
far as we have reviewed, it is the study in the literature closest to the current line of inquiry. They 
have concluded that access to finance is averagely higher in countries with PCB relative to those 
with PCR or neither institution. Our results confirm and reject the underlying conclusion. First, 
on the rejection front, the following inferences are apparent. (1) The results on financial 
efficiency are broadly inconsistent in the view that contrary to PCR which have insignificant 
impacts, PCB exerts a negative effect on banking system efficiency. Hence, it follows that PCB 
are more detrimental than PCR when it comes to facilitating access to finance. But it should be 
noted that this rejection is only partial because we are comparing ‘significant positive effects’ 
from the underlying study with ‘insignificant and negative’ impacts. (2) With regard to financial 
size, we have established that while PCB and PCR exert positive effects on financial size, the 
impact of the latter is higher, which is contrary to the findings of the underlying study which 
have established that the impact of the former is higher instead. Second, on the confirmation 
front, the following can be observed. (1) From the findings on financial depth, there is: (i) a 
confirmation if the comparison is exclusively based on magnitude of estimated coefficients and 
(ii) a rejection if we are dealing with the signs of estimated coefficients. (2) The discussion in (1) 
is also relevant to the findings on financial efficiency.  
 The above comparative evidence also implies that the role of ISO on financial access in 
Africa is still open to much debate. Meanwhile, variations in findings could be traceable to 
differences in indicators (or choice of financial development variables), periodicity (used of an 
updated sample) and methodology (endogeneity-robust), which we have already engaged in the 
introduction.  
 The third strand discusses corresponding concerns about the ‘quality of life hypothesis’ 
(QLH)
4
 enjoyed by financial institutions and the role of ISO (PCR and PCR). Accordingly, in 
                                                          
4
 The QLH is a postulation that, financial institutions  with higher market power would invest less in pursuing 
intermediation efficiency: instead of tailoring the advantage of their favorable position to  granting more loans to 
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light of the findings, we might be attempted to infer that instead of improving financial access, 
African financial institutions are taking advantage of information provided by ISO to increase 
their profit margins. As to what concerns the role of ISO, we may also be tempted to infer that 
these are not fulfilling their missions as theoretically expected. This is essentially because ISO 
are expected to reduce informational rents associated with high cost of credit (financial activity). 
Given that: (i) ‘quality of life’ is enjoyed by big banks with substantial market power and (ii) 
ISO are relevant to controlling the abuse of market power, we may also be tempted to infer that 
banking competition is not very tensed. Hence, the role of ISO in financial development in the 
continent may not be having the desired effects because they have not outweighed the power of 
big banks by, inter alia; rendering credit market contestable, sharing information to enhance 
competition and reducing informational rents (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). Hence, policy 
could use other measures to inter alia: (i) limit the financial market power of a few banks and (ii) 
enhance a competitive financial environment.   
 This leads us to the fourth strand, which discusses the possible nexus between the 
findings of this paper, moral hazard (on the part of customers) and ISO as a disciplinary device 
for borrowers.  The intuition here is that information sharing by PCR and PCB may not be 
yielding the desired outcomes in financial development because of continuous moral hazard 
issues from borrowers. Accordingly, even when banks have lost all potential informational rents 
from the activities of ISO, they may still not be willing to lend if they are not motivated by the 
higher a repayment probability. This is essentially because, ISO also play the role of a ‘discipline 
device’ for borrowers by providing incentives to perform and reduce moral hazard. In this light, 
a policy implication may be tailored with the assumption that, ISO are not effective at 
disciplining borrowers to reduce their moral hazard, because of a plethora of reasons, among 
others: borrowers are not afraid to lose their reputation, corruption in lending may be rampant 
and recourse to financing mechanisms from the informal financial sector could be a genuine and 
reliable alternative.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
borrowers at affordable prices, they would prefer to  ‘exploit their market power’ for more gains or enjoy  a ‘quite 
life’ (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
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4. Conclusion and future research directions 
 
We have examined policy thresholds of information sharing for financial development in 53 
African countries for the period 2004-2011. Public credit registries (PCR) and private credit 
bureaus (PCB) are used as proxies for reducing information asymmetry whereas financial 
development is measured in terms of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The empirical evidence 
is based on interactive Generalised Methods of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. 
The following findings have been established. First, PCR and PCB have negative effects on 
financial depth, with the magnitude of the former higher. Second, contrary to PCR which have 
insignificant effects, PCB has a negative impact on banking system efficiency. Third, PCR and 
PCB have negative effects on financial activity, with the magnitude of the latter higher. 
Moreover, marginal effects for both are negative. Fourth, PCR and PCB have positive effects on 
financial size, with the effect of the former higher. While marginal effects are positive, 
corresponding thresholds are not within range.  
 The above findings have shown that, with the exception of financial size, the introduction 
of information sharing offices in Africa as a policy of increasing financial access  have instead, 
for the most part led to the opposite effects. We have also investigated whether increasing the 
number of underlying registries/bureaus would result in the expected effects. Unfortunately, we 
are tempted to infer that reducing information asymmetry is enhancing financial allocation 
efficiency and facilitating the availability of credit. This naturally leaves enough room for future 
research directions, notably: (i) more in-depth analysis on the relevance of information sharing 
offices and (ii) mechanisms by which their missions could be fulfilled.  Moreover, assessing the 
relevance of information sharing offices throughout the conditional distributions of the financial 
dynamics could also yield interesting policy directions.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 34.279 22.294 6.363 112.83 377 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 78.073 20.255 4.032 99.949 399   
       
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. GDPg: GDP 
growth.  
.  
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        Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 291) 
           
Financial Development Dynamics     
    Info. Asymmetry Other variables  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size        
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.970 0.094 0.103 0.821 0.629 0.398 0.416 0.147 -0.104 -0.080 0.055 -0.295 0.140 M2 
 1.000 0.130 0.220 0.886 0.754 0.452 0.409 0.303 -0.091 -0.063 0.070 -0.320 0.149 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.243 0.154 0.303 -0.016 -0.144 -0.169 -0.133 -0.176 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.583 0.743 0.242 0.067 0.510 -0.056 -0.097 -0.149 -0.179 -0.189 FcFd 
    1.000 0.922 0.478 0.448 0.439 -0.092 -0.089 -0.055 -0.343 0.093 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.413 0.293 0.556 -0.088 -0.073 -0.057 -0.324 0.019 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.249 0.343 -0.061 -0.142 0.198 -0.403 0.210 Dbacba 
       1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 PCR 
        1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 PCB 
         1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg 
          1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 Inflation  
           1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt 
            1.000 -0.309 NODA 
             1.000 Trade 
               
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits (liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  
          Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Info: Information. PCR: Public Credit 
          Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Info: Information.  
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Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
        
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin.  Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrd Pcrdof Dbacba 
M2(-1) 0.9837       
Fdgdp(-1)  0.990      
BcBd(-1)   0.9438     
FcFd(-1)    0.9815    
Pcrd (-1)     0.9919   
Pcrdof(-1)      0.9945  
Dbacba(-1)       0.9330 
        
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial 
deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from  deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial 
institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. M2(-1): Lagged value of Money Supply. Fin: 
Financial.  
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